Introduction

Global Megatrends

1. Dominance of scientific technology (especially ICT) in the lives of even common people. Knowledge Revolution—human capital, knowledge society.
4. Enormous increase in psychological and existential problems. Quest for meaning. Spiritual Revolution; global spiritual movement.
5. Emergence of global civilization.

Western Philosophy vis-a-vis Indian Philosophy

1. Western Philosophy (WP) is a philosophy of Values; Indian Philosophy (IP) is a philosophy of Reality. Reason in WP and IP.
   WP has surrendered ontology to science; it is now concerned chiefly with epistemology and linguistics. In IP, ontology is dominant and is integrated with epistemology; it is unaffected by science. Concept of Microcosm and Macrocosm in IP.
   There is a philosophical vacuum in Western thought today; it can be filled up with Indian philosophical inputs.
3. In WP there are now Four lines of philosophical investigation.
   a) Conscousness Studies: this has only recently begun. Controversy between David Chalmers and Daniel Dennett over ‘qualia’. IP has accumulated extraordinarily vast amount of knowledge of consciousness.
   c) Linguistic Studies. (Hermeneutics, Constructivism, Post-structuralism, Post-modernism)
   d) Knowledge Revolution. Till recently discussion on knowledge centred around the sources of knowledge, tests of truth etc. Now the question is, What is knowledge? Views of WP and IP on what knowledge is.
4. Sri Ramakrishna’s doctrine of Samanvaya. Swami Vivekananda’s doctrine of ‘manifestation’.
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The Relevance of Indian Philosophy: Some Contemporary Philosophical Problems and their Solutions from an Indian Perspective

My aim is to demonstrate the relevance of Indian philosophy to contemporary Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the mainstream of Western philosophy. Hence I have discussed the following questions in my books or papers: 1) How to reconcile some of the conflicting views, 2) how to suggest new or better solutions, 3) how to solve some age-old or unsolved problems and, 4) how to add new dimensions to Western philosophy. I have focused on the following topics of philosophy of language, as well as logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics.

A. Some Problems of Meaning

(1) Meaning of a proper name. Two conflicting theories in contemporary philosophy: Description or sense theory and the causal or historical explanation theory. The Nyāya reconciles these conflicting views.

(2) Meaning of a definite description. Theories of Frege, Hilbert-Bernays, Russell-Quine, Strawson-Geach, and free logicians.

The Nyāya analysis of descriptions and proper names in expressions such as (a) Scott is Scott, (b) Scott is Sir Walter, (c) The author of Waverley is the author of Waverley, (d) Scott is the author of Waverley, (e) The author of Waverley is Scott, (f) The author of Waverley is the author of Ivanhoe, (g) Scott exists, (h) The author of Waverley exists, (i) The author of Waverley.

I have reconstructed the Nyāya theory of definite descriptions from Gadādhara’s remarks on the use of the word ‘one’ in the sense of ‘one and only one’. Since the Nyāya theory avoids the postulation of supposed or imagined objects and retains the distinction in meaning between ‘the so-and-so’ and ‘the so-and-so exists’, it is better than Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.

(3) Indexical expressions or egocentric particulars or demonstrative pronouns such as ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘it’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘I’, ‘you’, etc.

The views of C. S. Peirce, Hans Reichenbach, B. Russell, and David Kaplan.

The Nyāya solution: The Nyāya preserves the difference between the referent, the property of being the referent, the meaning or the limitor of the property of being the referent, the rule for the use of an indexical, and the method of learning the rule.

(4) Meaning of a sentence: Some contemporary theories: sense or thought or concept, behaviour, use, verification, speech acts, and truth-condition. Shortcomings of these theories. The Nyāya on the meaning of a sentence as distinct from the meanings of words which occur in it.

(5) Transformations: consider the following pairs of sentences:

(a) Brutus killed Caesar.
(b) Caesar was killed by Brutus.
(a) There is at least one square roof of 4.
(b) The concept square roof of 4 is realised.
(a) John gave a book to Tom.
(b) Tom received a book from John.
(a) John sprayed paint on the wall.
(b) John sprayed the wall with paint.
(a) Bees are swarming in the garden.
(b) The garden is swarming with bees.
(a) The floor has a pot.
(b) A pot is on the floor.

Contemporary philosophers of language, such as Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Fillmore and Jackendoff, are concerned with this problem, but there is no unanimity among their views. The Nyāya distinction between `The floor has a pot' and `A pot is on the floor' will throw some light on this broader issue and will answer the question whether transformation preserves the meaning.

(6) Indian philosophers have introduced different types or levels of meaning such as etymological, conventional, deep structure, causal, metaphorical and suggestive.

(7) Two approaches to understanding the meaning of a complex sentence: atomistic and holistic.

The Nyāya has developed a logic for a holistic approach.

B. **Meanings of logical locutions such as `all', `if-then', and `not'**

(1) Contemporary philosophers such as Russell, Wittgenstein and Prior on `all'.

The Nyāya has drawn distinctions among the following sentences:

(a) All human beings are mortal.
(b) Whoever is a human being is mortal.
(c) Wherever there is humanity, there is mortality.

(2) Contemporary philosophers on `if-then' which is central for logic. According to Ingalls the *Nyāya-Kosa* has listed thirty-four definitions of pervasion or `if-then'. He also makes the claim that hundreds of manuscripts of commentaries are still available on these definitions.

(3) Negation: Indian philosophers have discussed this topic at linguistic, epistemic and ontological levels. The Nyāya has discussed four types of negation and sixteen types of double negation.

C. **Subject and Predicate**

Contemporary philosophers such as Frege, Russell, and Strawson have discussed this topic. But the question why the predicate only is incomplete or unsaturated remains unanswered.

The Nyāya deals with this question, and gives reasons for it.

Following Indian philosophers the subject-predicate distinction can be discussed at surface structure level, deep structure level, semantic or ontological level, epistemic level, and logical level.

Moreover, the Nyāya philosophers have introduced another five pairs analogous to the pair subject-predicate for drawing the distinction between perceptual, inferential and verbal cognitions.

D. **Doubt, Belief, knowledge, and knowledge of knowledge or higher order cognition**

(1) Doubt, according to the Nyāya, rests on certainty. Hence there is no scope for universal scepticism.
Doubt has been divided into four types, depending on causal conditions.

(2) There are six approaches to the problems of belief-sentences in contemporary philosophy. The Nyāya philosophers have explained belief-sentences without postulating either propositions or sentences, or intensional entities such as concepts or images as contents of our belief. The Nyāya can explain the difference between the following belief-sentences:

(a) John believes that Shakespeare is the author of *Waverley*;
(b) John believes that the author of *Waverley* is Shakespeare;
(c) John believes in Shakespeare;
(d) John believes in Pegasus;
(e) John believes that Shakespeare exists;
(f) John believes that Ortcutt is a spy;
(g) John believes that (Ex) (x is a spy);
(h) (Ex) (x = Ortcutt and John believes that Ortcutt is a spy)
(i) John believes that Ortcutt is not a spy;
(j) John believes that Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy
(k) Tom believes that John believes that Shakespeare is the author of *Waverley*.

(3) Most contemporary philosophers have defined knowledge as justified true belief. Gettier has put forward certain counterexamples and the contemporary philosophers are dealing with this problem. But the Nyāya conception of knowledge is such that the Gettier-type counterexamples cannot be advanced against it, as justification is a qualifier of truth and truth is a qualifier of belief.

(4) Indian philosophers have also discussed higher order knowledge or cognition. Broadly speaking, there are three views on this topic, and the literature is comprehensive and technical.

E. **Existence**

All the systems of Indian philosophy have discussed the concepts of existence. In the Nyāya alone we come across at least seven senses of ‘existence’. Unlike some contemporary philosophers, the Nyāya does not consider the sentence ‘Scott exists’ or ‘I exist’ to be meaningless. Some contemporary philosophers have equated the sentence ‘Scott exists’ with ‘Scott is Scott’, or ‘“Scott” has a reference’, or ‘“Scott” is non-empty’, or ‘Scott has not escaped’, or ‘“Scott” has a role in our language-game’. But the Nyāya preserves the distinction between them.

F. **Truth**

According to the followers of the Nyāya, truth is a property of a cognition. Unlike the Western concept of correspondence, which is relational in nature, the Nyāya philosophers do not claim that a proposition is true if it corresponds to a fact. This is due to the fact that the Nyāya does not postulate a tertiary entity called ‘proposition’. Similarly, the Nyāya does not postulate ideas or images which resemble things in the world, although they postulate relational entities which are due to the relation between the things in the world and cognition. Truth is defined in terms of three properties of a cognition.

G. **Number**

Frege-Russell concept of number as the class of classes of things is not incompatible with the Nyāya concept of number. According to the Nyāya a particular number is a property of a collection as well as a quality of its members. Moreover, the Nyāya has accepted universal numbers to give an account of particular numbers. Some of the features of our cognition can be explained in terms of the Nyāya concept of number. Hence it has epistemic
importance as well. In this respect, the Nyāya philosophers have gone beyond the set-theoretic semantics of contemporary philosophers.

H. Causality

Indian systems, such as Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, Nyāya, and Vedānta, have discussed several problems of causality from different standpoints. Causality, in the context of Indian philosophy, plays an important role not only in metaphysics, but also in epistemology, ethics, and all other branches of philosophy. The following questions, amongst many others, have been discussed by Indian philosophers:

1. Whether there are negative causal conditions,
2. Whether the material cause (upādāna kārana) contains the effect in an unmanifest form prior to its production,
3. Whether an effect has one and only one cause, not a set of causal conditions,
4. Whether causality (kāranatva) can be defined in terms of efficacy or productivity (artha-kriyākāritva).
5. How to define and classify causal conditions (kāranas).
6. Whether the terms, such as ‘cause’, ‘event’, and ‘action’, refer to the same thing.

I. Perception

Some contemporary philosophers have put forward sceptical arguments against the perception of physical objects. But the Nyāya philosophers have demonstrated how to avoid these arguments. Moreover, the Indian philosophers, by and large, have discussed both ordinary and extraordinary perceptual cognitions. They also claim that there are both a set of positive and a set of negative causal conditions of perception. In order to explain certain types of perceptual cognitions, such as doubt or illusion, the Nyāya philosophers have postulated extraordinary relations, such as the cognition of universal as a relation, and cognition itself as a relation.

J. Inference

Some contemporary logicians such as Belnap, Anderson, and Routley are very unhappy with the classical symbolic logic of Frege-Russell, which does not emphasize the relevance between premise(s) and conclusion, or between premises.

The Nyāya logicians emphasise this relevance condition in addition to the truth of the premises in a valid inference. They also discuss the epistemic conditions for an inferential cognition.

According to the Nyāya logicians relevance is a relation which relates the contents of two sentences or expressions. The nature of this relevance relation is to be explained in terms of the content of a cognition which gives rise to a question which is a causal condition for the second term of this relation. Moreover, the Nyāya philosophers have discussed several types of this relation.

Hence for the explanation of ‘relevance’ also Indian philosophy is relevant to contemporary Western philosophy.

K. Verbal Cognition or Testimony

Like other sources of cognition, verbal cognition has also been explained in terms of its causal conditions. The verbal cognition lies in cognising the meaning of a sentence or complex expression. As regards the meaning of a sentence, it is claimed that it lies in the relation of the referents of the two terms of a sentence, simple or complex.
Usually the cognition of words that have occurred in a sentence, the memory-cognition of the referents of the words, the cognition of the relation between a word and its referent, syntactic expectancy between the words (ākāṅkṣā), semantic compatibility (yogyatā), contiguity of words in space and time (āsatti) and the cognition of the intention of the speaker (tātparya-jñāna) are considered as causal conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence.

L. **Concepts of Human Being**

Western philosophers, by and large, have defined human beings in terms of rationality and animality. Following the suggestions of existential philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, a human being may be defined in terms of certain mental states, such as anxiety, dread, or free choice. Hence these philosophers emphasise certain emotions, not rationality, in their description of human beings. But the Indian philosophers, by and large, emphasise a different set of characteristics in their definition of the concept of human being. In their explication of this concept, at least the following four features have been emphasised:

a) the concept of ought or ought-not  
b) the concept of free will  
c) the concept of infinity in knowledge or love  
d) the concept of creativity or suggestive meaning in art, music, literature etc.

Since this description is more comprehensive, it may be used to reconcile the conflict/tension between the two major theories of Western philosophers.

M. **Suffering**

Indian philosophers have considered suffering as the foundation of philosophical discourse. Broadly speaking, suffering has been classified into three types, namely:

a) suffering due to body (ādhibhautika)  
b) suffering due to natural disaster (ādhidaivika); and  
c) suffering due to mind or spirit (ādhyātmika).

It is to be noted that suffering forms one of the four noble truths in Buddhism. Buddhist philosophers emphasise not only physical and mental suffering, but also suffering due to change or conditioned state. But almost all the philosophers have emphasised methods for alleviating not only human suffering but also the suffering of sentient creatures at large. Metaphysical freedom has been defined in terms of absence of suffering. Since Indian philosophers have discussed not only human suffering but also the suffering of animals, their discussion would throw some light on contemporary issues such as our duties towards animals or animal rights in general, and the preservation of nature at large.

N. **Freedom**

There are several uses of the word “freedom” in the West as well as in the East. In the philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics, the word “freedom” usually refers to free will. This discussion leads us to the controversy between fatalism, determinism, compatibilism (soft determinism), and libertarianism. In this context I have pointed out that most Indian philosophers have accepted compatibilism in psychology or philosophy of mind.

But in metaphysics, especially in the context of Indian metaphysics, “freedom” means “liberation from bondage”. Indian philosophers have used the word mokṣa, or nirvāṇa, to refer to the metaphysical concept of freedom. In spite of a range of meanings of the word mokṣa in different
systems of Indian philosophy, all of them have accepted one cardinal meaning, namely, cessation of all types of suffering.

As regards the nature of metaphysical freedom, we come across as many as seven senses of word “nirvāṇa” in Buddhism alone. Moreover, I have discussed Swami Vivekananda’s concept of freedom, as he claims that it can be realised here and now (or in this life). Professor Krishna Chandra Battacharya, a neo-advaita vedāntin, has discussed both the psychological concept of “free will” and the metaphysical concept of “freedom.”

Indian philosophers, by and large, claim that freedom, or having “free will,” is an essential property of human beings. In their psychology of action, knowledge or cognition, plays a very important role. This is due to the fact that desire depends on cognition or knowledge, mental effort on desire, physical effort on mental effort, and action on physical effort.

As regards paths for the realisation of the metaphysical freedom, all the systems have emphasised knowledge, the practice of righteous actions and devotional love, in varying degrees. According to our positive thesis there are degrees of freedom, both psychological and metaphysical, depending on the context or situations. Hence, we can realise it in varying degrees, depending on our station in life (the situation we find ourselves in) or competence. Moreover, psychological free will is related to metaphysical freedom, as the righteous (dhārmic) actions will lead us to freedom if performed without selfish motive. Therefore, a type of soft determinism in moral actions will pave the way for metaphysical freedom.

I have also discussed how to realise freedom from suffering at social or global level. Here the Advaita concept of Oneness may also be used to alleviate the sufferings of teeming billions.

O. The Law of Karma

The Law of Karma is an important concept for both East and West. It is usually stated as “As you sow, so you reap”, or “You reap what you sow”. Philosophers have tried to correlate morality with happiness, and immorality with suffering or discord. Since we do not always come across this type of correlation between virtue and happiness or between vice and suffering, philosophers have postulated after life, God, immortality of the soul etc. Kant has also postulated God and after life in order to correlate virtue with happiness.

Some contemporary Indian philosophers such as Swami Vivekananda, have tried to make morality independent of God or after life. Following the suggestions of these philosophers, the Law of Karma may be stated thus:

“As you do unselfish moral actions, you realise your dignity as a human being, and as you do selfish or immoral actions, you lose your dignity as a human being”. In other words, by performing unselfish moral actions, one attains a holy, transcendent, impersonal or universal state, but by doing immoral actions one is degraded to an ignoble state.

P. Concepts of Harmony

Indian philosophers, by and large, have suggested methods for resolving conflicts at individual or social level. They have also suggested how to remove suffering – both mundane and spiritual. Hence the theories of classical Indian philosophers can be used to solve current conflicts at social or national level. Therefore, the disputes over creed, colour, race, language, region and nation can be resolved.

The Vedic philosophers have tried to resolve the conflicts between righteous actions (dharma), worldly possessions (artha), sensuous pleasures (kāma), and liberation (mokṣa) by arranging them in a hierarchical...
order. The Jaina philosophers have tried to resolve some of our conflicts by introducing different points of view (anekāntavāda). Some Indian philosophers, especially the followers of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, have suggested different paths or methods for the realisation of the same goal. Hence disputes between religious practices, rituals, ceremonies or between religions may be resolved using this method.

The Advaita method, as expounded by Swami Vivekananda, is very important for resolving several types of dispute. This method introduces the concept of ‘Oneness’ or common goal which is freedom from suffering. It goes back to the following Vedic thought: “That which exists is one, but sages call it by various names”. It is claimed that the oneness refers to the ultimate goal of life, or certain values such as brotherhood, friendship, justice and love.

Now the question is how to realise love or universal brotherhood at a global level, when approximately twenty percent of the total population of the world own sixty percent of the land and natural resources; or when the density of the population of Asia is more than forty times higher than that of Oceania; or when the per capita gross national product (GNP) in some countries such as USA and Australia is eighty times higher than that of developing nations such as Cambodia and Nepal; or when the GDP of eighty percent of the global population in developing countries is only one quarter of the total GDP.

In order to achieve global harmony and peace, I would like to refer to another message of the Indian philosophers: “The entire world is your relation”. This ideal can be realised at global level if the resources, such as food, water and land are shared evenly. This would remove the root cause of poverty for the teeming billions and the root cause of conflict or war between nations at global level. Hence the message of the Vedāntins is the message of freedom, peace, bliss and global harmony. It is for the betterment of the entire world. Email:jaysankar.shaw@gmail.com
PROF. GOPAL CHANDRA KHAN (BURDWAN UNIVERSITY)

The Western concept Secularism in the Perspective of Sri Ramakrishna’s
‘যত মত তত পথ’

I. Secularism pertains to the relation between state and religion.
II. Ever since independence, or even before the days of independence, our people have been debating on secularism as a nation-building principle. Unlike its counterpart, Pakistan, the free India preferred to go the secular way. Part III, Articles 25 to 28, of the Indian Constitution, as was originally adopted by our Constituent Assembly in 1949, guaranteed right to freedom of religion to all persons residing in India; they were equally entitled to the freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health. But somehow these articles did not appear to be sufficient. Thus by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1976, the Preamble of the Indian Constitution was modified by the interpolation of two more expressions, one of which is ‘secular’. And yet the debates on secularism continued. Today, we are hearing even louder talks on secularism. Then, what are these talks all about?

III. As far as we follow our people’s mind, they normally do not decry secularism but they are unable to agree on one meaning of secularism. What is explained to be true secularism in one quarter is branded as pseudo-secularism in another quarter, and the debates go on. But the social reality of India today is such as it demands a speedy resolution of the meaning of the concept of secularism.

IV. Secularism is predominantly a Western concept and yet our people got embroiled in it so far as independence was fragmented over the issue of the relation between state and religion.

V. Ancient Greece is said to be the cradle of European civilization. It was divided into so many city-states. The Greeks were pagans and worshipped many deities. Indeed, every Greek city had its own deity. But hardly had they quarreled over their deities. The position was otherwise with the people subscribing to Semitic religions. The Old Testament, for example, fanatically advocated for a theocratic state of the Hebrew people. A theocratic state is one nation, one state, and one religion. Moreover, the religion is claimed to be the supreme code of life, the law of the land being subservient to the commandments of this particular religion.

VI. Jesus moderated the Hebrew concept of the theocratic state. He allowed for a separation of the religious authority from the state authority. But he also spoke of one religion and one God. He spoke of a ‘good Samaritan’ but did not adhere to the idea of religious pluralism. That different people professing different religious faith should live together side by side in one and the same state was not among the ideas of his religion or of his ‘Kingdom of God’. Thus St. Augustine sent aside Jesus’ moderation, and reaffirmed the theocratic notion of the ‘City of God’.

VII. When we come to Islam we find a revival of the Roman conception of one world-nation, this time under the umbrella of our world-religion, Islam. Islam further subscribe to the Torah conception of religion as the complete code of life, and also advocated for the enactment of the blasphemy law to be applied equally to all people living in the state.

VIII. As a reaction to this kind of religious aggression, and further, the development of modern science, the concept of secularism started to grow in the Western world. People from Christian nations in particular discovered in Jesus a statement ‘Render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and render unto God what is God’s’. This is the first conception of secularism.
IX. Jesus’ call for a separation of power or of authority over man’s material, mundane or temporal aspects of life, and his spiritual, transcendent or temporal aspects of life did work for some time in the West with occasional hiccups because the Western nations were predominantly Christian nations. It will not work in a state that is religiously pluralistic. Already we notice tensions are mounting up in European nations.

X. Religion is a private affair of the individuals and has nothing to do with the state—this is the second conception of secularism. V. I. Lenin advocated for this form of secularism. However, ‘private religion’ is a conceptually impossibility; it is as impossible as the concept of private language.

XI. Atheism is the highest form of secularism—this is the third conception of secularism. Dialectic Materialism propounded by Marx is one such atheism which is also claimed to be the highest form of secularism. But Marxism does not solve problems to which secularism address itself. By dislodging all religions Marxism tends to become anther religion.

XII. Secularism is the primacy of moral laws to which the laws of the land and the religions of the people are subservient—this is the fourth meaning of secularism. For this conception of secularism the moral laws are to be strictly defined as, to use a Kantian language, unalterable categorical imperatives. However, it is almost impossible to discover or to impose a set of moral laws to be applied equally to all human individuals of all states. Or else, it will be yet another version of one world-theocratic state.

XIII. The predominantly Indian meaning of secularism is sarvadharmasamabhava or equal respect for all religions. The state does not favour any particular religion but does not disrespect any religion either. The Constitution of India is sometime interpreted as envisaging this conception of secularism. Secularism here does not mean irreligion or atheism or even stress on material comforts. It proclaims that it lays stress on the universality of spiritual values. However, as this conception of sarvadharmasamabhava has its negative as well as its affirmative meanings. Negatively, it means noninterference of one religion on other religion. But it leaves much to be desired. It does not help either reconciliation or integration of the people of the state.

XIV. The best idea of secularism is tolerance as well acceptance of religions in their mutual dealings. The best idea of religious pluralism, religious tolerance and religious acceptance is to be found in Sri Ramkrishna and Vivekananda. To quote from Ramakrishna, “I have practiced all religions – Hinduism, Islam, Christianity – and I have also followed the paths of the different Hindu sects. I have found that it is the same God toward whom all are directing their steps, though along different paths. You must try all beliefs and traverse all the different ways once, wherever I look, I see men quarrelling in the name of religion—Hindus, Mohammedans, Brāhmos, Vaishnavas, and the rest. But they never reflect that He who is called Krishna is also called Siva, and bears the name of the Primal Energy, Jesus, and Allah as well – the same Rama with a thousand names. A lake has several ghats. At one of the Hindus take water in pitchers and call it ‘jal’; at another the Mussalmans take water in leather bags and call it ‘pani’. At a third the Christians call it ‘water’. Can we imagine that it is not ‘jal’, but only ‘pani’ or ‘water’? How ridiculous! The substance is One under different names, and everyone is seeking the same substance; only climate, temperament, and name create differences. Let each man follow his own path. If he sincerely and ardently wishes to know God, peace be unto him! He will surely realize Him.”
PROF. INDRANI SANYAL (JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY)

**Developing Excellence of Character: Reactions and Responses from the Standpoint of Dharma-ethics**

In the field of Classical Dharma-ethics – of the Vaidikas, Baudhhas and Jainas- and in the contemporary literature of Dharma-ethics the main focus is upon the development and transformation of character of a person from her acquiring Dharma (virtue/righteous conduct) through pursuing the path of Dharma (moral duties /morally obligatory actions) for making possible her ascension to the highest state/level. The role of an individual as a moral agent is central in Dharma ethics for the psychology of the agent is the determiner of her actions, but her actions are nonetheless important. In this lecture, my objective is to make clear this very concept of developing character and to concentrate on some of the suggested methodology for achieving that goal. This would explain how it has been possible for Dharma-ethics to set side by side theory and practice instead of considering ethics as primarily an academic subject. In this connection, I would be mainly concentrating upon Sri Aurobindo’s concept of ‘Harmony of Virtue’. Of course similar sort of approach to ethics is not unknown to the West and, in fact, Aristotle had said that the Ethics has the form of a search for ‘the ultimate good’ and he provided some criteria for identifying that ultimate goal of human life, which requires ‘some activity in accordance with virtue’. This Aristotelian approach to ethics, known as virtue ethics, which is ‘agent-centric’, however, does not characterize the whole field of western ethics. In recent times because of observing inadequacies of action-centric ethics – whether teleological or deontological- to tackle baffling moral issues, dilemmas and concerns, we find a resurgence of interest in agent-centric approach to ethics in the West as well. It is for me to find out whether a comparative approach to ethics with these two different conceptual frameworks possibly would ignite a new spirit to moral deliberations as a whole.

PROF. AMITA CHATTERJEE (JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY)

**Can Western Logicians imbibe anything from Indian logicians?**

Indian Logic is generally traced to Indian theories of inference. Though many scholars have attempted to understand and interpret classical Indian Logic in terms of Aristotelian syllogism or First Order Predicate logic, yet differences among two traditions are so pronounced that it is always better not to conflate the two. As Mohanty has explicitly put, ‘The anumāna theory is a system by its own right. If it is not the same as either Aristotelian syllogistic or modern predicate calculus, it is not for that reason illogical. Using ‘logical’ in a transcultural sense, our task is to perceive its internal logicality, if there is any such: let us call it ‘logical2’, reserving ‘logical1’ for the standard use in the Western context’. (Mohanty, 1992) In this presentation, first I would like to show in what ways logical2 differs from logical1 and then I would like to explore how logical1 can be benefitted by its interaction with logical2.
PROF. ARINDAM CHAKRABARTI (STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY, USA)

Testimony and Knowledge of Knowledgehood: What contemporary Western epistemology learned from classical Indian epistemology.

People glean knowledge from other people’s—doctors’, parents’, scientists’, eye-witness’s—words. Yet, some people—even some entire communities or civilizations find it hard to acknowledge their epistemic debt to other people. It is highly likely that Descartes was inspired by Al-Ghazali’s autobiographical account of deriving certainty about the self from the act of doubting but never acknowledged that influence. As Alison Gopnik has shown, David Hume learned some of his anti-self arguments from the records of Buddhist No-Self argumentation preserved by Jesuits at the French Jesuit College in La Fleche, but never breathed a word about it in his published writings. In late twentieth century, debates regarding the reducibility or irreducibility of testimony to inference were introduced from Indian epistemology to analytic Western theories of knowledge. This paper will summarize, from Sanskrit primary textual sources, the arguments of the supporters and deniers of word of authority as an independent source of knowledge. It will also highlight the importance of the distinction between knowing that p and knowing that one’s belief that p is indeed knowledge. For all its analytic sophistication, contemporary Western epistemology does not formulate the issues surrounding this distinction as clearly as post-Ganges’a Indian epistemology did.

PROF. MADHUMITA CHATTOPADHYAY (JADAVPUR UNIVERSITY)

Model for Successful Communication: A Proposal from Buddhist Point of View

Communication has been the main concern in the philosophy of language. Twentieth century philosophers in the West, like Ludwig Wittgenstein, B. Russell, J.L. Austin, P.F. Strawson, Grice, to mention a few, have offered different theories to account for the meaning of the different linguistic expressions used in the context of successful communication. A communication is successful when the hearer is able to understand the meaning of what the speaker is saying and also if the hearer is able to apprehend the intention of the speaker. For this purpose what is required is formulation of rules for meaningful communication.

Necessity of such rules has been felt not only by modern Western thinkers. In the subcontinent of India this necessity was felt from the very beginning. The early text that contains systematic discussion on this is the Carakasamhita. Since the text is basically on medical science, the theory that has been presented here has a limited application, where the persons concerned are either the physicians themselves or the patients, that is persons having connection with medical science. Later on other schools of Indian philosophy have developed their own theories of communication, taking some clue from the Carakasamhita.

In the early Mahayana Buddhist texts like the Yogadarabhumi, Bodhisattvabhumi and Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga we have elaborate discussion on communication under the heading Samkathyaviniscayah. Though these texts are basically aimed for the training of the Bodhisattvas, among the five branches of study recommended for them, one is sabdasastrastha or the study of grammar. But in some cases situation may be such that merely making a grammatically correct sentence is not able to convey the proper sense to the hearer. As such Asanga has specified
some qualities under the heading vādālāṁkāra. These refer to knowledge of contexts, not only of the speaker but also of the hearer (svaparasamayajñatā), accomplishment of speech arts (vākkaraṇasampannatā), confidence (vaiśāradya), restraint (sṭhairyā) and resentfulness (dākṣiṇya). Accomplishment of speech art stands for the five varieties of qualities necessary for communication like being non-rustic (agrāmya), easily understandable (laghur bhavati), persuasive, coherent and significant. Asaṅga not only specifies the qualities necessary for making successful communication, he also speaks of the defects which need to be avoided in the context of a meaningful communication.

So, a detailed analysis of the discussion made by Asaṅga on vādālāṁkāra and related topics as found in the Sāṅkṣyaviniścaya section, can provide a model of communication which may be seen as an alternative to the Western theory of communication.

PROF. DILIP MOHANTO (CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY)

Is Scepticism self-stultifying? : A Nāgārjunian Examination

I propose to examine this from the point of view of cognitive scepticism. I call a thinker cognitive sceptic if he questions or raises doubt about the cognitive claims of others, i.e., cognitivists. A cognitive sceptic denies all possibilities to claim that there is any logically indispensable connection between our knowledge-claim and the grounds for yielding it. In Indian Philosophy it presents a philosophical position which suspends the possibility of making conclusive statements concerning cognition (pramāṇa) for want of adequately warranted causal grounds (pramāṇa-s). Jayarāja and Nāgārjuna represent such way of philosophy which consists of refuting the views of other without advancing any thesis. They “charge against our standards of proof is not that there are others which work better. The ground on which he attacks them is that they are logically defective or if not defective, at any rate, logically questionable.”¹ I propose to limit myself only to Nāgārjuna's philosophy. I consider the Nyāya position as cognitivist one. However, I am not sure about giving a better solution to the same type of problem dealt in Western philosophy. But I am sure that from my analysis it will be evident that Indian philosophers contributed much to the argumentative culture of the world in its unique way and from the study of cognitivist-sceptic debate in Indian philosophy any philosophy— no matter whether Western or Eastern— will be benefitted. It will also reveal the rich argumentative aspect of India’s Cultural Democracy.

History tells us that Nāgārjuna's philosophy has come down to us more through 'misunderstanding and exaggerations' than through a proper understanding and appreciation of its foundational tenets. Because of misreading of the texts especially by his philosophical opponents, sometimes perhaps because of the technicality involved in his way of philosophizing, it was much 'blamed but little understood'. Without trying to enter into the spirit of technical use of the term 'sunya' it has been named Śūnyavāda, a philosophy that denies the reality of this world altogether. So there are some mistaken interpretations and unfounded criticisms of the concept of Śūnyatā (emptiness). Again, a recent writer has branded the Mādhyamika philosophy as a form of irrationalism which advocates a chaotic or irrational conception of reality. But an impartial re-reading of texts and commentaries will show that it is a philosophy which has become the subject of "more sinned against than sinning".
Perceiving God: Swami Vivekananda’s Argument for the Epistemic Value of Supersensuous Perception

Scholars like Anantanand Rambachan and C. Mackenzie Brown have criticized Swami Vivekananda for his frequent appeals to spiritual experience. These scholars argue that Vivekananda overlooks the fact that mystical experiences are merely subjective and, hence, cannot possibly provide knowledge of objective realities. I will contend, however, that such criticisms are unjust, because Vivekananda does, in fact, present a highly sophisticated and novel six-premise philosophical argument for the epistemic value of supersensuous perception. To my knowledge, no scholar has discussed, or even so much as recognized, this argument in Vivekananda’s work. After briefly reconstructing Vivekananda’s argument, I will indicate some of its points of relevance with contemporary work in analytic epistemology and philosophy of religion.

Argumentation as a Social Epistemic Method: Vedanta Desikar in Conversation with Alvin I. Goldman

Western traditional epistemology, particularly the Cartesian tradition, was highly individualistic, analyzing cognitive operations of individuals in isolation from others. Alvin I. Goldman, in his Knowledge in a Social World, views that given the interactive nature of knowledge in the modern world, individual epistemology needs a social counterpart. Social epistemology, thus promoted by him, focusses on social epistemic methods that have veritistic orientation. Among the generic social epistemic practices he enlists, the complex speech practices of arguing and debating feature as major ones. Arguments are defined by him as complex speech acts in which people not only advance a factual claim but present reasons or evidence in support of it, like say, “R1…Rn, therefore (probably) p.” Argumentation occurs when the speaker presents an argument to an audience, in which he asserts and defends the conclusion by appeal to the premises. He goes on to distinguish different types of argumentation, viz., the monological, dialogical and debate., and proceeds to formulate rules for debate and claims that conformity with such rules can promote the goal of truth. It surprised me beyond words that Goldman was totally unaware of an ancient philosophical tradition that considered debate manuals as forming the major chunk of philosophical methods. It is an oft quoted statement in India that philosophical knowledge gets generated only through debates: vade vade jayate tattvabodhah. Philosophy here was never conceived as something that one could develop in isolation, it needed the other. The dialogical method was deeply ingrained in the very system of philosophizing in this land, wherein the other functioned as a touch stone, so to say, by which one could ascertain the value and genuinity of one’s thesis.

Since the advent of Nyayasutra of Goutama, vada as a philosophical method was at the centre stage of philosophizing and meticulous efforts were made to sharpen and perfect this tool so that the tattvavabodha brought out by it too is perfect. Soon Baudhhas followed the suit and early attempts along these lines can be seen in Asanga’s Mahayanasamgraha, which was followed by a full-fledged work on the topic by the great Vasubandhu titled Vadavidhi. While the Buddhist schools continued
this tradition with later thinkers like Dharmakirti coming up with more serious works on this (Vadanyaya), the other systems too realized that debate manuals need to be written that suite their philosophical aspirations. Later we find Jainas and schools of Vedanta coming up with their own manuals of vada.

Dakshinavarta, the lower planes that lie beyond the Vindhyas was known to be the cradle of different Vedanta doctrines, and between 10th and 16th centuries the place became a busy corridor of philosophical transactions, where successive thinkers from the three main streams of Vedanta, in their earnest endeavours to defend and promote their respective traditions, turned the peninsula a busy market place of philosophical ideas, with crisscrossing debate moves, masterminds issuing commands, at the same time crying foul at others, loud roars of lion like figures that silenced the rest, all engaged alike in the task of raising their respective edifices to further heights. In the present paper, to cite an Indian instance of argumentation to juxtapose with Goldman’s theory, I shall echo one such roar, the roar of a kavitarkikasimha, Sri Venkatanatha popularly known as Vedanta Desikar. Justifying the popular belief that he was the incarnation of the temple bell of Lord Venkateswaras, his voice rang loud in philosophical assemblies, with piercing arguments, but at the same time soothing too, with flowery poetic imageries. His Nyayaparisuddhi, popular as a basic text for Visitadvaita epistemology, devotes a chapter exclusively for argumentation. The present paper tries to juxtapose the two epistemic traditions, different in their origin, with distinct cultural and philosophical aspirations, but converging at some points, and thereby opening up possibilities for a dialogue between the two philosophical traditions. While Goldman’s theory has a minimal goal, namely, to locate truth in evidence, the vada manual of Desikar appears to have a wider and more philosophical objective to fulfil. The paper would strike both similarities and differences between the two approaches, of Desikar and Goldman, in projecting argumentation as a social epistemic method.

PROF. PRIYAMBADA SARKAR (CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY)

Influence of Indian Philosophy on ‘Ecosophy’ of Arne Naess (1912-2009):

Deep Ecology is one of the most important environmental philosophies of our time, Arne Naess, the founder of deep ecology movement, elucidated eight-point platform to encapsulate their claims of which Biospheric egalitarianism, Symbiosis along with caring for the richness and diversity of life-forms and EcosophyT are philosophically important. In this paper there will be an attempt to analyse the influence of Indian philosophy on these concepts involved in deep ecology. It is a fact that Arne Naess himself in his writings quotes verse 6.29 of the Bhagavadgita, a sacred religious text of the Hindus as influencing his thoughts on deep ecology. This verse is important in the sense that it points to the oneness of all living beings, which ultimately leads to one’s own self-realization.

Not only that, Naess often admits that “his work on the philosophy of ecology, or ecosophy T, developed out of his work on Spinoza and Gandhi and his relationship with the mountains of Norway” 1. The word ecosophy is a combination of the Greek words oikos (household) and sophia (wisdom) and thus refers to the philosophical wisdom concerning our household. The “T” stands for Tvergastein, where he has done his most productive philosophical thinking and writings. Ecosophy stresses on the concept of self-realization i.e. extension of oneself and realization of oneself in everything, which is again directly related with the verse 6.29 of BhagvadGita.

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However, although the author directly acknowledges his influences, yet it is not as linear as it appears. The scholar gets puzzled by the vexing questions: How could ecosophy, the philosophy of nature and environment be developed out of the staunch idealistic tradition of the *Upanishads* and *BhagavadGita*? How could it be even influenced by the philosophy of Gandhi? Does it imply that the philosophy of Gandhi deviated from those of the *Upanishads* and *Bhagavadgita*? This paper will be an attempt to sort out these questions and analyze how one could interpret ecosophy as being influenced by Indian Philosophy.

**PROF. PRABAL KUMAR SEN (CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY)**

**Notions of Sangati and its Varieties**

I propose to present a short paper on the *notion of saṅgati* and its *varieties* in the forthcoming International Seminar that will be held at RMIC during January 2020. Saṅgati may be translated variously as (i) relevance, (ii) association, (iii) fitness or appropriateness, (iv) relation or interconnection and so on. The question regarding the *sangati* between a particular section of a book and the next one is usually pointed out by the commentators, which shows that the topics discussed in that book are interconnected, and hence, relevant to each other. In texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, six types of such *saṅgati*-s are mentioned [viz. prasaṅga, upodghāta, hetutā, avasara, nirvāhakaikya and kāryaikya]. In the commentarial literature that grew around *Mīmāṃsakṣa*-s of Jaimini and *Brahmasūtra*-s of Bādarāyaṇa, where each *adhikarana* or section is devoted to the interpretation of some Vedic passage, some other *saṅgati*-s are mentioned [viz. *adhikarana saṅgati* that discusses the relevance of a particular *sūtra* on aphorism to the section concerned, (ii) *pādasaṅgati*, i.e. relevance of that aphorism to the particular division of chapter in which it occurs, (iii) *adhyāyasaṅgati*, i.e. relevance of that aphorism to the main topic of the chapter in which that aphorism occurs, and so on.] Of late, the notions of relevance has been discussed by modern logicians [e.g. R.K. Mayer, E.D. Mares, R. Routley, G. Restald and others], as well as philosophers of language [ e.g. D. Wilson and D. Sperber etc.], and a discussion of Saṅgati may be of some interest to them.

**PROF. ANAND VAIDYA, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY, USA**

**Timothy Williamsons’s Knowledge-First In Conversation With Nyaya Epistemology**

In this paper I use Jay Shaw’s interpretation of Nyāya in perception and Stephen Phillip’s interpretation of Nyāya on knowledge to engage Timothy Williamson’s theory of perceptual knowledge. I argue that there are interesting similarities between the two and that the paradigm of perceptual knowledge that both Williamson and Nyāya advance is an important departure from both Plato’s account of knowledge and that of many analytic epistemologists of the 20th century.
PROF. AMIT CHATURVEDI, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

Reconstructing a Nyaya Theory of Consciousness

This paper examines resources from the history of Nyāya philosophy for developing a theory of consciousness. I argue that there is a general commitment among Nyāya thinkers to a version of first-order representationalism (FOR), a view which claims that the phenomenal character of a conscious mental state is determined by that state’s representational content, and that a mental state can consciously represent the world without itself being represented by another mental state. However, like early formulations of FOR in contemporary philosophy, classical Naiyāyikas would face a basic problem of explaining how a mental state could be unconscious while still sharing same content as a conscious state. In turn, a solution to this problem can be reconstructed from the thought of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the 14th century Navya Naiyāyika of Mithilā. Gaṅgeśa is the first Nyāya thinker to hold both that non-conceptual perceptions (nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa) have a different type of content from concept-laden perceptions, and that a subject has no phenomenological evidence for the existence of its own non-conceptual states. I interpret Gaṅgeśa’s account of non-conceptual perception as attempting for the first time in Nyāya to articulate a subdoxastic, subpersonal, and subconscious level of mental representation. From this account, we can discern the causal processes whereby unconscious, non-conceptual contents of early perception yield integrated perceptual representations which can figure within the unified experience of a conscious subject. I conclude by suggesting that Gaṅgeśa’s theory of consciousness in some ways offers an independently plausible version of the contemporary global workspace theory of consciousness.

PROF. RAGHUNATH GHOSH (NORTH BENGAL UNIVERSITY)

The Concept of Tarka and Reductio-ad-absurdum : A Comparative Study

The doubt of deviation (vyabhicāraśamkā) can be removed through the application of Tarka, which is the limit (avādhi) of doubt. So Tarka along with the perception of the coexistence of hetu and sādhyā and non-perception of the deviation (vyabhicārāgraḥa) of the same would become the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. It cannot be argued that Tarka is not possible without repeated observations. For, a wise can apply Tarka with the help of the perception of the coexistence and non-perception of deviation (vyabhicārāgraḥa) of hetu and sadhyā. The definition of Tarka as found in the Nīlakaṇṭhaprakāśikā on Dīpikā of Tarkasamgraha runs as follows: ‘Āhāryavyāpaka-vattābhramajanyā āhāryavyāpyavattābhramastarkah’ 3. That is, Tarka is an imposed (āhārya) erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervader (vyāpaka), which is produced by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a pervaded (vyāpya).

The method of Indirect Proof, often called the method of proof by reductio-ad-absurdum, is familiar to all. In deriving theorems, Euclid often begins by assuming the opposite of what he wants to prove. If that assumption leads to a contradiction, or ‘reduces to an absurdity’, then the assumption must be false, and so its negation, the theorem to be proved, must be true. First, Tarka is both formally and materially true while Reductio-ad-absurdum is formally true, but may not materially. Secondly, Reductio-ad-absurdum is taken as an Indirect Proof, but Tarka is enumerated under apramāṇa, though it assists in proving something (pramāṇamukrāhaka). Lastly, though the Nyāya does not admit it as a pramāṇa but some other schools have shown their importance towards Tarka in the name of ūha.
In the glorious periphery of Indian philosophy, vast discussions about epistemology are often seen. Each and every system of Indian philosophy has opined on the origination of knowledge, validity and non-validity of knowledge, sources of valid knowledge and their numbers etc. from their own particular perspective. Since all these schools possess different views in the field of metaphysics, naturally the difference has also occurred in the area of epistemology and for this reason Indian philosophy contains a record of different philosophical thoughts of several traditions.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that among all the systems of Indian philosophy, Nyāya has made a lot of significant contributions in the field of epistemology. According to it, the term buddhi (cognition) denotes the same thing as upalabdhi (apprehension), jñāna (knowledge), and pratyaya (awareness). We find a similar view in Prāśastapādabhāṣya also, “buddhirupalabdhirjñānaṁ pratyaya iti paryāyaḥ”. Still it is noteworthy that other systems are not quite unanimous with them in this regard.

Considering the differences in the nature of various cognitions, the Naiyāyikas distinguish knowledge in different forms. First, they divide it into two broad varieties: anubhava or presentative and smṛti or non-presentative, e.g. memory. Anubhava is a sort of knowledge which is presentational in nature. On the contrary, smṛti is a reproduction of previous experience. These two divisions are again divided into two forms: yathārtha (valid) and ayathārtha (non-valid).

Thus, anubhava or presentative knowledge is of two kinds, yathārtha and ayathārtha. The term yathārtha means a particular cognition which is called pramāṇa only when it reveals an object as it really is. For example, the cognition of water in a river is pramāṇa. On the other hand, if the cognition does not reveal an object as it really is, it would be non-valid. For example, the cognition of water in a mirage is a non-valid one. It is also known as apramāṇa.

Apart from the previous one, there exist some forms of knowledge which are presentative in nature but not valid. These form the class of non-valid presentative knowledge (ayathārthāanubhava) which is stated as apramāṇa. The Nyāya further divides non-valid cognitions in three classes: doubt (saṁśaya), error (viparyaya), and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Here one important point may be noted. Among these three divisions of apramāṇa, there exists a subtle difference. Undoubtedly viparyaya or bhrama denotes false cognition which means an incorrect presentation of an object. But the nature of the other two divisions, saṁśaya and tarka, is not similar to that of error. We cannot say that saṁśaya is invariably contradictory because in many cases one alternative of a doubt is valid. In addition to this we can also say that hypothetical reasoning (tarka) actually is a process which leads to a valid conclusion, but it is never accepted as a valid form of cognition. The present paper deals with the concepts of Tarka (hypothetical argument) which is enumerated as invalid cognitions (apramāṇa). Though this particular form of invalid cognitions has got less importance in Indian epistemology due to its inability to become pramāṇa-yielding means (pramāṇas), but it is very much important so far as its mythological value is concerned, which is to be addressed in this paper.
Revisiting Nyaya Theory of Deductive Reasoning

Western modern deductive logic has come up with an explanation of validity of deductive arguments. The fundamental faith is that a deductive argument is valid because of the meanings of certain words—called logical words—occurring in crucial positions in the premises or in the conclusion of a given argument. The truth-theoretic (semantic) explanation of validity explains how truth conditions of premises are contained in the truth conditions of the conclusion, given nothing else but just the logical words with their truth-theoretic meanings occurring in crucial positions of the argument. This paper explores whether a similar feature is present in the Nyaya theory of deduction as well explaining how truth condition of premises are contained in the truth condition of the conclusion. Deviating from the western view that the meanings of logical words are what matter, our exploration into the Nyaya thoughts arrives at a positive answer, though within some restrictions, if a particular view about the notion of 'vyapti' is maintained. Abstract. David Hume argued that since induction presupposes principles such as causality, uniformity of nature, etc. that are themselves inductions, induction is invariably circular. Various solutions challenging Hume have been offered by Russell, Strawson. Popper, etc. More recently Goodman has argued with the help of concocted predicates like 'grue' that the same inductive evidence might lead to conflicting predictions. Different solutions to this so called "Grue" problem have been suggested by Goodman, Quine, etc. I shall argue that none of these attempted solutions is satisfactory. I shall also argue that both the classical Humean problem of induction and the more recent "Grue" problem of induction were anticipated by Gangesha in his "Tattvacintamani." I shall try to show that Gangesha's solutions of these two problems are defensible.

Logic without Necessity

It is widely held that logic gives us necessary truths that are objective in nature. The idea of necessity is usually meant to imply that if Y is a logical consequence of X₁…Xₙ, then given that the latter set of premises is true, Y must be true. In other words there is a necessary connection between X₁…Xₙand Y. Correspondingly the idea of a valid logical proof consists in holding that the conclusion must follow from the given premises provided the logical operations are correctly applied. This is what precisely distinguishes a logical proof from an experiment. An experiment, even if performed following all the accepted norms, does not involve the idea of necessity in so far as the justification of the hypothesis is concerned. If logic succeeds in deriving truths that are necessary in this sense, then the truths thus derived are objective in the sense that the truth of these statements is not derived from the elements that are associated with the subjective history of the person who is deriving the truths. Looked at this way logic is hailed as the paradigm of certainty. Philosophers down the centuries have been inspired by the necessary character of truths that logic yields and so have formulated their philosophical systems resting on the structure of logic that they hope would generate knowledge which will be considered indubitable. If the ideas of logical necessity and objectivity are questioned, then our intuitive conception of logical proof and logical consequence
would also be threatened. Logic, then one could fear, would lose its charm and seriousness. None the less, the idea of logical necessity has been questioned by philosophers resulting in the attempt to reformulate the very subject matter of logic. The present paper is an attempt to assess the skepticism about the idea of logical necessity exploring the consequences of such skepticism for the Nyaya theory of inference consisting of five stages. The moral that I would like to draw from this is that the Nyaya theory of inferential reasoning, although does not encash the traditional idea of logical necessity, certainly deserves to be considered as a theory of logic in a significant sense and thus rebutting the charge of psychologism often brought against Indian logic. With a brief account of the debate regarding psychologism in the context of Western philosophy, I shall try to argue that one can give an account of Indian logic that does not succumb to psychologism. In the next step I will try to show that Indian logic could be said to involve the idea of necessity, but it must be cautioned here that this Indian notion of necessity is different from the idea of logical necessity that we find in the Western philosophical tradition. If we can make a distinction between the source and justification of the idea of necessity, then perhaps one could argue that in so far as the justificatory aspect is concerned Indian logic could be said to involve necessity but, of course, in a qualified sense.

PROF. JAYASANKAR LAL SHAW (VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND)

Definite Descriptions: Russell and Gadādhara

The aim of this paper is to discuss the Nyāya use of the term “one and only one”. The Navya-Nyāya philosopher Gadādhara has discussed the use of the term “only one” in the context of the Nyāya conception of number. My aim is to reconstruct the Nyāya theory of definite descriptions following the suggestions of Gadādhara’s use of the term “only one.” The Nyāya philosophers have also discussed the distinction between a definite description, such as “the author of Waverly,” and the sentence “the author of Waverly exists.” Hence the Nyāya use of the quantifier “some” cannot be equated with the existential quantifier of Russellian logic. Moreover, according to the Nyāya, a definite description is a sentence, not a term. A sentence has been defined as a set of morphemes having mutual syntactic expectancy.

The symbolic counterpart of the expression “the author of Waverly,” may be expressed by (a) \((\exists x)(Fx \land (y)(y \neq x.Fy) \supset ((\text{absence of } y \text{ by the relation } R)x)))\). It is to be noted that the Nyāya explains the meaning of “only one” in terms of having a negative property. Let us take “Fx” as “x is an author of Waverley”. If there is another author of Waverley, then the second conjunct of (a) is false. Hence (a) as a whole is false. If y is not an author of Waverley, then the antecedent of the second conjunct is false. Hence the second conjunct is true. Since the first conjunct is true, (a) is also true. It is to be remembered that (a) is similar to Russell’s analysis of a definite description which has the following form:

(b) \((\exists x)(Fx \land (y)(Fy \supset x=y)))\).

In this context I shall also mention the Nyāya concept of negation, as the law of transposition has not been accepted as universally valid. I shall also compare and contrast Russell’s theory of definite descriptions with that of the Nyāya and emphasise the importance of not having identity between an actual and a supposed object.
The aim of this paper is to focus on the relevance of Indian Philosophy to contemporary Western philosophy so that it can be integrated with the main stream of Western philosophy. Hence I shall discuss how to suggest new solutions to some of the problems of the contemporary philosophy of language and logic, and how to retain some of the distinctions present in ordinary language.

In order to substantiate these aims I shall evaluate Russell’s theory of definite descriptions in the light of my reconstruction of the Nyāya theory of definite descriptions, which is based on Gadādhara’s explication of one of the uses of the word ‘one’. Since this use of the word ‘one’ is the same as the use of the word ‘one and only one’, my reconstruction may be considered as the explication of the Nyāya theory of definite descriptions. Hence I shall mention 1) how the Nyāya would draw the distinction between a proper name and a definite description, 2) how the Nyāya would draw the distinction between a definite description such as “The author of Waverley” and a sentence such as “The author of Waverley exists” or “The author Waverley is the author of Waverley”, 3) how the Nyāya philosophers would avoid the postulation of concepts for the explanation of non-designating terms such as “unicorn”, and 4) how the Nyāya would avoid the identity between an actual and a postulated entity, as we come across this type of identity in Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.

The first section of this paper will deal with Russell’s theory of definite descriptions, which is the greatest contribution of Russell to logic or philosophy of logic. The second section will deal with my reconstruction of definite descriptions following the suggestions of Gadādhara, a Navya-Nyāya philosopher.